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RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE
THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE FOR THE ACTS
AND OBLIGATIONS OF LOCAL DE FACTO
GOVERNMENTS AND REVOLUTIONISTS
By N. D. HOUGHTON*
T HER. are several reasons for considering the matter of the
responsibility of the state for the acts of local de facto gov-
ernments along with responsibility* for the acts of revolutionists.'
In the first place, no clear distinction is made in popular usage
between the terms "de facto government" and "revolutionists." In
the second place, most d6 facto governments originate in some
sort of revolution. And finally, the responsibility of the state for
the acts of local de facto governments and for the acts of revolu-
tionists is, in general, dependent upon the same conditions, name-
ly, the ultimate outcome of the movement.
A local de facto government, as distinguished from a general
de facto government, is a government which is in actual control
of affairs in a section or part of a state only.? Such a govern-
ment may be maintained by any of the following forces :3
1. an enemy in military occupation of the region;
2. a revolutionary element attempting to secure independence
and the establishment of a new state; or,
3. a revolutionary element contending against another fac-
tion for national control. 4
Until recently no attempt was made by adjudicating authori-
ties to define just how great a portion of a state's territory must be
*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University ,f Arizona,
Tucson, Arizona.
'The term "revolutionists" is here used to include -rebels."
2A general de facto government is a government which is set up
by a revolutionary element, displacing the regular government and
constituting itself the central government of the state in control of
political affairs throughout the state. See l3rchard, Diplomnatic Pro-
tection of Citizens Abroad, 206. See also Thorington v. Smith, (1869)
8 AWall. (U.S.) 1, 19 L. Ed. 361.
3Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 20o, 207.
4Another situation in which a local de facto government some-
times operates, in the absence of revolution in the ordinary sense of
the term, is in the case of vigilance committees and emergency organi-
zations which sometimes handle local affairs after great disasters.
such as floods and storms, and in other emergencies.
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controlled by a de facto government in order that it may be con-
sidered a general, as distinguished from a local,' de facto govern-
ment. 6 In March, 1926, however, the Mexican-United States
General Claims Commission indicated that after the Huerta gov-
ernment ceased to exercise "real control and paramountcy . . .
over a major portion and a majority of the people of Mexico,"
it could properly be considered only a local de facto government.'
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF LOCAL DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS
WHICH ULTIMATELY BECOME DE JURE, AND FOR ACTS
OF SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONISTS
The question of the responsibility of a state for the acts and
obligations of a local de facto government is somewhat more
complicated than that of the responsibility of a state for acts of
a general de facto government." But it is a generally accepted
principle of international law that the acts of a de facto govern-
ment of the former type which accomplishes a successful revolu-
tion and becomes ultimately, the established de jure government
of the state, are considered binding, from its inception, upon the
state."
sAfter having described a general de facto government, the
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case ot Thorington v.
Smith, (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 1, 19 L. Ed. 361, stated: "But there is
another description of government, called also by publicists a govern-
ment de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated
a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics
are, first, that its existence is maintained by active military power within
the Territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and
lawful government; and second, that while it exists, it must neces-
sarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of
obedience, rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible as wrong-doers, for those acts though not warranted by
the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort
are established over districts differing greatly in extent and condi-
tions. They are usually administered directly by military authority.
but they may be administered also by civil authority, supported more
or less directly by military force."
6 Borchard, (1917) 26 Yale L. J. 340.
7 Though the Commission did not use the exact term, it did use
the concept. See Geo. W. Hopkins v. The United Mexican States,
(1926) Docket No. 39, General Claims Commission, United Stateg
and Mexico.
8 Generally speaking, the acts of a general de facto government
are binding on the state. Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citi/ens
Abroad 207.
96 Moore, Digest 991-994. See also a note written by 1)r. Moore
on June 21, 1913, as Counselor of the United States Department of
State, concerning claims of American citizens for damages from the
Madero revolt in Mexico. (1913) For. Rel. 949.
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In the case of Dix v. Venezuela,0 the Venezuelan-United
States Claims Commission of 1903 held Venezuela liable for the
payment of a claim by an American citizen for live stock which
was confiscated by the military forces of General Castro during
the revolution of 1899 in Venezuela. The Commission stated
that:
"The Revolution of 1899, led by General Cipriano Castro, proved
successful, and its acts, under a well-established rule of inter-
national law, are to be regarded as the acts of a de facto gov-
ernment .... The same liability attaches for encroachments upon
the rights of neutrals in the case of a successful revolutionary
government, as in the case of any other de facto government."
General Castro's government ultimately became the recognized
de jure government of Venezuela.
In the case of Bolivar Railway v. Venezuela,1 Mr. Plumely,
umpire in the British-Venezuelan Claims Commission of 1903,
holding Venezuela liable for a claim for compensation for serv-
ices rendered by a British Corporation to the Castro government
during its revolutionary struggle of 1899, stated that:
"The nation is responsible for the debts contracted by its
titular government, and that responsibility continues through all
changing forms of government until the obligation is discharged.
The nation is responsible for the obligations of a successful revo-
lution from its beginning, because, in theory, it represented ab
initio a changing national will, crystallizing in the final successful
revolt .... Success demonstrates that from the beginning it [the
Castro revolution] was registering the national will.' 2
litportance of Recognition.-Moreover, it appears that it
has not been deemed essential that such a de facto gov-
ernment shall have been recognized at the time of the acts in
question by the government of the claimant, in order that the
state be held responsible for such acts. In fact, it is perhaps
unlikely that in most cases recognition will have been granted,
for foreign states are not ordinarily hasty in recognizing de facto
governments of this sort, due, in part at least, to the fact that
premature recognition of such a government is likely to be con-
sidered an unfriendly act by the regular government of the state
in which the revolt is taking place.
10(1903) Ralston, Ven. Arb. 7.
"2(1903) Ralston, Ven. Arb. 388.
"2See also Heny v. Venezuela, (1903) Ralston, Ven. Arb. 14; Kum-
merow v. Venezuela (1903) Ralston Ven. Arb. 526, 559-561; Redler &
Co. v. Venezuela, (1903) Ralston Ven. Arb. 539, 561; Hughes v.
Mexico, 3 Moore, Arbitrations, 2972; (1901) For. Rel. 550.
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The United States, in 1886, held the Peruvian government,
under the presidency of General Caceres, liable for payment for
certain property which the forces of the Caceres government had
seized from an American firm in 1884,18 during the period when
the Caceres government was in revolution, which was ultimately
successful, though at the time of the seizure the Caceres gov-
ernment was in control of only a portion of Peru, and had not
been recognized by the United States. It was not intended, said
the state dpeartment, to question the generally admitted princi-
ple that a state is not responsible for the acts of insurgents whom
the government cannot control. But it was pointed out that,
"The guano which was seized was appropriated to sustain a
cause which has become national by the voluntary action of the
people of Peru, its chief representative being at the present time
the duly elected and installed constitutional executive of the
Republic.14
Similarly, the United States, in 1898, held Peru responsible for
mistreatment of an American citizen by a revolutionary force
in 1894, which finally accomplished a successful revolution and
was in power as the government of Peru in 1898, though the
revolutionary government had not been recognized by the United
States at the time of the acts in question.1
RESPOINSIBILITY FOR ACTS OF LOCAL )E FACTO GOVERNMENtS
WHICH FALL WITHOUT BECOMING DE JURE, AND FOR ACTS
OF UNSUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONISTS
There is substantial agreement upon the general proposition
that a state is not responsible for the acts or obligations of
unsuccessful revolutionists whose activities have passqld beyond
the control of the de jure authorities. This principle ha. been
'
1 For instances in which the United States has held 1'ert rvpo1-
sible for acts of successful revolutionists see (1901) For. Rel. 427-434.
And for a similar instance N ith tlondura5, ,ee (1899) For. Rel. 352-
354.
146 Moore, Digest 992.
15(1901) For. Rel. 430.
For the importance of recognition in the matter of reslmosilbilhty
of the state for acts of a general de facto government, see jansen %.
Mexico, (1871) 3 Moore, Arbitrations 2973; Schultz v. Mexico, (1871) 3
Moore, Arbitrations 2902; Day and Garrison v. Venezuela, (1885) ,1
Moore, Arbitrations 3548; Jarvis v. Venezuela, (1903) Ralton, Ven.
Arb. 145; Kenneth v. Chambers, (1852) 14 How. (U.S.) 38, 14 L.
Ed. 316; Jones v. United State's, (1890) 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. c't. 8o,
34 L. Ed. 691; Thorington v. Smith, (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 1, 19 L. E'd.
361. But see also the British-Costa Rican Arbitration of 1923. This
decision is published also in (1924) 18 Am. J. Int. L. 147 ff.
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recognized by various international commissions in adjudicating
-upon claims arising out of such situations.1" So, the capacity of
a local de facto government to bind the state, and therefore, suc-
ceeding governments, depends largely upon its ultimate success.
If it finally becomes the de jure government of the state, or if
the region over which it exercises control becomes an independent
state, then its acts, from its inception, are binding, upon the
old state or the new state, as the case may be. But if it fails, the
succeeding de jure government may refuse to consider many of
its acts and obligations as binding upon the state."'
In the case of Williams v. Bruffy,18 the Supreme Court of the
United States stated that the validity of the acts of such a de
facto government, "both as against the parent state and its "citi-
zens or subjects, depends entirely upon its ultimate success. If
it fails to establish itself permanently all such Acts perish with it.
If it succeed and become recognized, its Acts from the commence-
ment of its existence are upheld as those of an independent
nation." Continuing, Mr. Justice Field instanced the case of the
state governments upon their separation from the British Empire.
"Having made good their Declaration of Independence, every-
thing they did from that date was as valid as if their independence
had been at once acknowledged. . . But if they had failed in
securing their independence, and the authority of the King had
been re-established in this country, no one would contend that
their acts against him or his loyal subjects, could have been up-
held as resting upon any legal foundation."
Denying that the acts of the Confederate Government were
binding upon the country after its fall, the Supreme Court, in
the case of Tlorington v. Smith,9 stated that:
16See Hall, International Law 7th ed., 231; 2 Wharton, Digest
sec. 223. See also Jansen v. Mexico, (1871) 3 Moore, Arbitrations 2902;
Cummings v. Mexico, (1875) 3 Moore, Arbitrations 2976; Walsh %,.
Mexico, (1875) 3 Moore, Arbitrations 2978; Wyman v. Mexico, (1876)
3 Moore, Arbitrations 2978; McGrady v. Spain, (1874) 3 Moore, Arbi-
trations 2982; Hanna v. United States, (1871) 3 Moore, Arbitrations
2982; Sambiaggio v. Venezuela, (1903) Ralston, Ven. Arb. 680. See
further, 3 Moore, Arbitrations, 2972, 2973, 2977, 2979, 2980, 2987, 2900;
and (1912) For. Rel. 947, 961.
"The principle of non-responsibility for acts* of rebel enemies in
time of civil war rests upon the ground that the latter have withdrawn
themselves by force of arms from the control and jurisdiction of the
sovereign, putting it out of his power, so long as they make their
resistance effectual, to extend his protection within the hostile terri-
tory to either strangers or his own subjects, between whom, in this
respect, no inequality of rights can justly be asserted." Prats v.
United States, (1871) 3 Moore, Arbitrations, 2886, 2890.
'
7 Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 207.
18(1878) 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716.
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"No obligations of a national character were created by it,
binding after its dissolution, on the states which it represented,
or on the National Government.2 From a very early period of
the Civil War to its close, it was regarded as simply the military
representative of the insurrection against the authority of the
United States."
In this connection, the holding of the Mexican-United States
General Claims Commission, in March 1926, in the case of Geo.
W. Hopkins v. The United Mexican States,-' ought perhaps, to be
recalled. The Commission accepted the general principle that
the acts of a local de facto government "become binding on the
nation as of the date territory comes under its domination and
control conditioned upon its ultimate success." But it maintained
that what it termed the "unpersonal acts of the government itself
as an abstract entity."22 as distinguished from the "acts of, the
Huerta administration in its personal character," were binding
upon Mexico during the period after the Huerta government
ceased to be the "real master of the nation" and controlled only
a fragment of Mexican territory.
It appears to have been rather generally conceded by other
powers that the United States was not responsible for the acts
of the Confederate Government. In the case of Prats v. United
States,23 the Alexican-United States Claims Commission of 1868
stated that:
"The non-responsibility of the United States for the acts of its
late rebel enemies, while forcibly withdrawn from the jurisdiction
of that government, must have been generally conceded by other
nations; for, although many citizens of American and European
states were resident in the hostile territory during the struggle,
and suffered losses common to all inhabitants of the arena of war,
no nation has made a demand upon the United States for in-
demnity (unless the present case forms the execution), while it
is certain that that government would promptly repel all such
demands.""4
"(1869) 8 Vall. (U.S.) 1, 19 L. Ed. 361.2 I rofessor Borchard states that since the capacity of a local de
facto government to bind the state internationally depends prmauily
upon its ultimate success, most of its international acts, such its
treaties, are affected with a suspensi~e condition. If it is ultimately
successful then the state, the old or the new, is bound by theiii. If It
fails, then in general, its international act, (1o not bind the state.
(1917) 26 Yale L. J. 343.
21See footnote 7 and text.
22Tlose acts of the government N hich are e.sential to the ordi-
nary life of the people, such as postal service, railwvay service. etc.
233 Moore, Arbitrations 2886.
24Concurring in the opinion of the Commission as thus expressed
by 'Mr. Wadsworth, Mr. Palacio, Mexican commissioner, stated that,
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Some claims were presented, however, especially by Great
Britain to the British-American Claims Commission of 1871, in-
volving the question of the responsibility of the United States
for destruction of property of British subjects by the Confederate
authorities, and for debts contracted with British subjects. In
the case of Hanna v. United States,2 this Commission held the
United States to be not responsible for certain cotton which had
been destroyed by the Confederate authorities of the state of
Louisiana.", Mr. Frazier, American Commissioner, in his opin-
ion stated that:
"the particular 'State of Louisiana' which concurred and
participated in the destruction of the claimant's property, was a
rebel organization, existing and acting as such in hostility to the
Government of the United States as was the Confederate States,
so called. It was in form and fact a creature unknown to the
constitution of the United States, and acting in hostility to it.
It was an instrumentality of the rebellion .... It is not the case
of a government established de facto, displacing the government
de jure. But it is the case merely of an unsuccessful effort in
that direction, which, for the time being, interrupted the course
of lawful government without the fault of the latter. Its acts
were lawless and criminal, and could result in no liability on the
part of the Government of the United States."2-
DEBTS CONTRACTED BY A LOCAL DE FACTO GOVERNMENT
WITH FOREIGN SUBJECTS
As a general rule, a succeeding de jure government is not liable
for debts contracted by a displaced local de facto guvernment,
and persons who deal with such a government assume the risk
of the enterprise.28  In 1858, one Joseph Cuculla, an American
citizen, loaned some $40,000 to the Zuloaga government which was
engaged in a revolutionary attempt to maintain a government of
Mexico and was in control of the Capital of Mexico. The money
"It is in my opinion self-evident that in the present case there was
not any aggressive and direct action oi the loart of the authorities of
the United States; because the authors of the fact (Confederate naval
force) which has given origin to this claim. are neither de facto nor dejure authorities of the United States, nor ,f any of the stateN of the
Union."
253 Moore, Arbitrations 2886.
26For a distinction between the validity of the acts of the individual
insurrectionary state governments, and the acts of the confederate central
government, by the United States Supreme Court, See Sprott v. United
States, (1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 459, 22 L. Ed. 371.27For a similar holding by the British-Venezuelan Claims Commission
of 1903, see the case of Puerto Cabello and Valencia Railway v. Venezuela,
(1903) Ralston, Ven. Arb. 455.28Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 209.
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loaned was to be used "in the service of the nation." The Zuloaga
government, which the United -States had refused to recognize,
was finally ousted by the Jaurez faction, which established a
government under the constitution of 1857. The Jaurez govern-
ment.refused to pay the Cuculla loan. Part of it was paid by
the Maximilian regime, and a claim for the balance, with interest,
was presented by the .United States to the Mexican-United States
Claims Commission of 1868. The Commission unanimously
rejected the claim on the grounds, first, that the loan was an
unneutral act; and, second, that the Zuloaga government was not
an "authority" of the Mexican state, but an unsuccessful insur-
rectionary movement 9
A similar position was taken by the umpire3 in tile
Venezuelan-Netherlands Claims Commission of 1903, holding
Venezuela to be not liable for a loan made by a Dutch subject
to a de facto government in the state of Falcon in 1902. The
opinion said:
"A de facto government which would give this claim a position
before this Commission must be one recognized as such for the
Republic of Venezuela, and not one temporarily in authority in
a state or district under revolution and against the will and ptinl)ose
of the de jure . . government of the nation."
And further,
"While the government of General Rivera might have been
a de facto government for certain municipal purposes within the
State or District, when, for the time his was the supreme force
he had power to compel respect and obedience, it lacked all of
the characteristics of a de facto national government that could
speak and act in the name of Venezuela.
3 1
The policy of the United States, as declared by the fourteenth
amendment to the constitution, that "neither the United States
nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, ...
but all such debts, [and] obligations ...shall be held illegal and
void, 3- 2 was in effect sustained by the British-American Claims
Commission of 1871. The Commission unanimously dismissed all
claims of British subjects for debts contracted by the Con federate
authorities, holding that, "the United States is not liable for the
payment of debts contracted by the rebel authorities.."33
2OCuculla v. Mexico, (1871) 3 Moore, Arbitrations 2873.
3OMr. Frank Plumley.
8lHenriquez v. Venezuela, (1903) Ralston, Ven. Arb. 896.
32Declared a part of the Constitution by the Secretary of State, July
20, 1868.
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DISPOSAL OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
It appears to be conceded that a local de facto government
may not legally alienate or dispose of any part of the public
domain of the state, which may be temporarily within its juris-
diction.34 During the period of the Civil War the United States
prosecuted a claim against Peru, arising out of such an action by
a de facto government in Peru in 1858, but the claim was finally
abandoned.
Under authority of the Vivanco insurrectionary government,
which was in control of the city of Iquique in 1858, two American
owned ships were given permission to load and carry guano from
that vicinity. The two vessels were seized by a war ship of
the Peruvian government on the grounds that such carrying trade
could be legally engaged in only by express permission of the
Peruvian overnment. Peruvian law made such unauthorized tak-
ing of guano a criminal act and subjected vessels so taken to
confiscation. The United States protested the seizures and de-
manded payment for the vessels, contending that:
"The Georgfana and the Lizzie Tlwipson having obeyed the laws
of the place then established, and having acted in pursuance of
licenses given by the officers in authority, were guilty of nothing
for which the other party to the civil war could punish or molest
them afterward,"
and that,
"The laws and jurisdiction of the Peruvian Government were
superseded at Iquique during the time that place was in possession
of its domestic enemy, and its resumption of possession-supposing
possession to. have been resumed-gave it no power to punish
American citizens for a supposed violation of its laws while they
were suspended, nor to make any law which would have a re-
troactive effect." 35  -
The Peruvian government rejected the demands, setting forth
that, "the vessels at the time of the seizure were engaged in load-
ing guano from deposits which notoriously belonged to the Gov-
ernment of Peru, and had for years constituted the principal
source of its revenue," and that:
33Barrett v. United States, (1871) 3 Moore, Arbitrativns 2900; see
also 1 Moore, Arbitrations, 695.34Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 209. Professor
Borchard states that the fruits of public lands may be sold, but only those
parts accruing during the period of occupancy. See also Mumford v.
Wardwell, (1867) 6 Wall. (U.S.) 423, 18 L. Ed. 756 and Coffee v-
Groover, (1887) 123 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1, 31 L Ed. 51.
352 Moore, Arbitrations 1593 ff.
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"The authority to load was not obtained from the Government
of Peru, but from a usurping body of her subjects, committing,
by their very acts, treason against her and to whom no belligerent
recognition had been given by the United States, which had lately
negotiated a treaty with the government at Lima."30
A convention was finally adopted providing for submitting
the matter to arbitration, the King of Belgium being selected as
sole arbitrator. But he declined to act, giving as one of his
reasons that he did not desire to make a decision unfavorable
to the United States, as he felt he would have to do, if he should
act as arbitrator.IT Thereupon, the United States formally noti-
fied the Government of Peru of its intention to pursue the matter
no further.3 8
QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
A distinction must be made between the effect of the tncon-
stitutionality of a general de facto government and the tmcon-
stitutionality of a local de facto government in a consideration
of the matter of the responsibility of the state for their acts and
obligations. Whereas the question of the legitimacy, or the con-
stitutionality, of a general de defacto government is not material
in the matter of the responsibility of succeeding governments,
internationally, for its acts ;31 the matter of the unconstitutionality
of a local de facto government may be of great importance.
For, in case of an unsuccessful attempt at revolution or rebellion,
the acts of the revolutionists do not bind the state. A local de
facto government set up and maintained in opposition to the de
jure government by unconstitutional and illegal means, falls, if
the movement ultimately fails, into the class of unsuccessful revo-
lution. It was upon this ground that the acts of the Confederate
Government were held to be not binding upon the United States
by the Supreme Court.40
362 Moore, Arbitrations 1593 ff.
For the effect of recognition of belligerency upon the responsibility of
the state for acts of insurrectionary local de facto governments, see infra.
972Moore, Arbitrations 1593 ff.
382 Moore, Arbitrations, 1593 ff.
S5See Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 207; 1
Moore, Digest, 249; and the decision of Hon. W. If. Taft in the
British-Costa Rican Arbitration of 1923.
40See especially Mauran v. Ins. Co., (1868) 6 Wall. (U.S.) 1; 18
L. Ed. 836; Williams v. Bruffy, (1878) 96 U. S. 176; 24 L. Ed. 716;
Sprott v. United States, (1874) 20 Wall. (U.S.) 459, 22 L. Ed. 371;
Dewing v. Perdicaries, (1878) 96 U. S. 193, 24 L. Ed. 654.
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EFFECT OF RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY
Recognition of belligerency by the de jure government, or by
foreign states, appears to have little, if any, real effect upon the
responsibility of the state for the acts of unsuccessful insurrec-
tionary governments. Recognition of belligerency does not con-
stitute political recognition of such a government in any degree."'
And, in so far as it has any legal effect at all, aside from its
direct effect upon the conduct of the warfare between the revolu-
tionists and the de jure government, it seems to operate to release
the latter from all responsibility for the acts of the former.
About the only possible effect in this connection would
seem to be the fixing of a date from which non-responsibility
exists, 42 for actual existence of a state of war in such a case is
sufficient to establish nonresponsibility of the state for acts of
the belligerent de facto organization, in case it ultimately fails,
irrespective of whether the belligerency has been recognized by
other states or not.43
Discussing the legal significance of the recognition of belliger-
ency in connection with the Confederate Government, the Su-
preme Court of the United States, in the case of [Villiams v.
Bruffy, 4 pointed out that, "The concession of belligerent rights
to the rebellious organization yielded nothing to its pretensions of
legality," explaining that:
"When a rebellion becomes organized and attains such propor-
tions as to be able to put a formidable military force in the field,
it is usual for the established government to concede to it some
-belligerent rights. This concession is made in the interests of
humanity, to prevent the cruelties which would inevitably follow
mutual reprisals and retaliations."
Similarly, in the case of Hickman v. Jones,5 the Supreme
Court stated that:
"The recognition [of belligerency] did not extend to the pre-
tended Government of the Confederacy. The intercourse was
confined to its military authorities. In no case was there inter-
course otherwise than of this character. The rebellion was simply
an armed resistance to the rightful authority of the sovereign.
-Such was its character in its rise, progress, and downfall."
41Hall, International Law 93. See also Cia. Minera Ygnacio
Rodriguez Ramos S. A. v. Bartlesville Zinc Co., (1925) 115 Tex. 21,
275 S. W. 388.
42See Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 235, 236.
43Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 235, 236.
44(1878) 96 U. S. 176, 24 L. Ed. 716.
45(1870) 9 Wall. (U.S.) 197, 19 L Ed. 551.
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And, in the case of Prats v. United States,'4 0 the Mexican-United
States Claims Commission of 1868 held that the matter of recog-
nition or non-recognition of the belligerency of the Confederate
Government by Mexico in no way affected the question of the
responsibility of the United States for its acts. Mr. Wadsworth,
speaking for the Commission, stated that:
"So far, therefore, as the responsibility of the United States
to Mexico in this case is concerned, it is in nowise increased or
diminished by the failure of the latter to accord belligerent rights
to the Confederates.1
4 7
EFFECT OF AMNESTY
The question of the effect upon the responsibility of the state
for the acts of a revolutionary government, of the granting of
amnesty by the established government to the leaders in the rev-
olutionary movement has been before international commissions
on several occasions. But, in some instances, the question has
been complicated by other factors, such as specific treaty accep-
tance of responsibility; the opiniQns of the commissions are not
in agreement upon the question of the prihciple; and, the exact
status of international law upon the subject appears to be some-
what uncertain.
In the case of Baldwin v. Mexico,4 8 the umpire in the Mexican-
United States Claims Commission of 1839 held Mexico respon-
sible for confiscation of goods and false imprisonment of an
American citizen residing in Mexico, which wrongs were com-
mitted by a revolutionary "junta" in Tehauntepec, which operated
as a local government for some six months in the year 1833.
There was evidence showing that no effort was made by the
Mexican government to put down the junta; it was finally dis-
placed by granting amnesty to the persons who composed it,
and they were continued in office. The judicial proceedings to
which Mr. Baldwin objected were started under the junta regime,
but were continued under the succeeding government, which failed
463 Moore, Arbitrations 2886.
47See also the opinion of the Spanish Treaty Clims Commission,
Sen. Doc. No. 25, 58th Cong., 2d sess., especially pp. 5, 14 ff., 40 ff.
(1903); and Crandall, S. B., Principles of International Law Applied by
the Spanish Treaty Claims Commission, 4 Am. J. Int. L. 806. And see
Oriental Navigation Co. v. The United Mexican States, (Docket No.
411), Mexican-United States Claims Commission, established by the
convention of September 8, 1923, (1929) 23 Am. J. Int. L. 434.
483 Moore, Arbitrations 2859.
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to give satisfactory relief. It was held by the umpire that the
circumstances warranted the holding of Mexico responsible for
damages, since the junta authorities had never been treated by
the Mexican government as rebels, but rather were "clothed
with official honors" and permitted to continue "exercising high
functions."
This case was complicated, however, by the fact that a treaty
concluded in 1831 between the United States and Mexico guar-
anteed "special protection" to Americans in Mexico and to Mexi-
cans in the United States. There was ample proof of a lack
of due diligence in the use of proper means by the Mexican
government to protect Mr. Baldwin and his pr 6 perty. And, so
this was additional ground cited by the umpire for the decision
of the case. 49
In the case of Tie Montgo,50 a claim was submitted by the
United States to arbitrationi under an agreement with Colombia
of August 17, 1874, for compensation for a ship which had been
seized from American owners by revolutionists in Panama in
1871, who did not succeed in establishing their control there.
But the leaders were granted amnesty by the Colombian govern-
ment. It happened that in the treaty of peace with the revolu-
tionists, which granted them amnesty, the Colombian government
also agreed to pay for The Montigo. But, speaking of the effect
of amnesty, the umpire stated that:
"even in the absence of any express stipulation to that effect,
the grantor of an amnesty assumes as his own the liabilities
previously incurred by the subjects of his pardon toward persons
or things over which the grantor has no control."
And, the Swedish and Norwegian-Venezuelan Claims Com-
mission of 1903 held Venezuela liable for compensation for in-
juries to Swedish and Norwegian subjects by revolutionists main-
taining a de facto government in a section of Venezuela, on the
ground that, "at the time when the acts complained of were com-
mitted, and since then, the delinquents have not been chastised
or prosecuted, but, on the contrary, their principal leaders have
occupied for some time official positions, having been appointed
by the present Government of Venezuela, and that they are
cloaked with authority in the very region where the events took
place," and that by so doing, the Government of Venezuela
49See Lapradelle and Politis, Recueil des arbitrages 466, 467.502 Moore, Arbitrations 1421, 1438.
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"tacitly approves their conduct, and according to the principles
recognized by public law makes itself responsible for all the acts
done by them." 51
But, in the case of Divine v. Mexico,8 2 Sir Edward Thornton,
umpire in the Mexican-United States Claims Commission of
1868, held that the granting of an amnesty to revolutionists did
not render the state liable for their acts. The case involved a
claim presented by the United States for compensation for prop-
erty of American citizens seized by unsuccessful revolutionists in
Mexico in 1851. The umpire said:
"It is urged that the Mexican government granted an amnesty
to Carbajal and, therefore, made itself responsible for his acts.
Other governments, including that of the United States, have
pardoned rebels, but they have not on this account engaged to
reimburse to private individuals the losses caused by those rebels."
Thus, as indicated above, the opinions of international adjudi-
cating authorities have not been in entire accord upon the matter
of the effect of the granting of amnesty upon the international
responsibility of the state for the acts of unsuccessful revolu-
tionists. But it would seem to be of some significance that,
as a matter of fact, no case appears ever to have been presented
to any of the various commissions which sat to determine the
liability of the United States for acts growing out of the Civil
War, in which the assumption or the claim was made that the
United States had assumed responsibility for acts of the Confed-
erate Government because of having pardoned its leaders. 3
VALID ACTS OF LOCAL DE FACTO GOVERNMENTS MAINTAINED
BY UNSUCCESSFUL REVOLUTIONISTS
Under pressure, a government has been known to admit lia-
bility for acts of unsuccessful revolutionists. In 1861, Great
Britain made its recognition of the Jaurez government in Mexico
conditional upon its admission of responsibility "for the wrongs
and crimes of [the] Zuloaga and Miramon [governments]." 4
And, in 1923, one of the elements, at least, which led to the rec-
ognition of the Obregon government in Mexico by the United
t 1BoBavllins and Hedlund v. Venezuela, (1903) Ralston, Ven. Arb.
952.
523 Moore, Arbitrations 2980.
3Ralston, International Arbitral Law and Procedure 244. See also
Ralston, Law and Procedure of International Tribunals 356.
54See 3 Moore, Arbitrations, 2906. See also 52 State Papers, 237.
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States was an admission of responsibility, in principle, for the
acts of revolutionists in Mexico from 1910 to 1920.0
5
But, even in the absence of admission or acceptance by a suc-
ceeding de jure government of responsibility for the acts of a
defunct local de facto government, usually there will have been
certain definite, executed acts on the part of the de facto authori-
ties, the effect of which must necessarily arise, and the binding
force of which upon the state must be determined. Foreigners
who live within the area controlled by a de facto government
must submit to its jurisdiction. Thus, not only domestic legal
questions arise, but international questions also, in case the de
jure government sees fit to disregard the acts of the de facto
regime.5"
Jhe laws enacted by a local de facto government of ordinary
domestic concern will usually be upheld by a subsequent de jure gov-
ernment, provided they are not hostile to the subsequent govern-
ment, and provided further that such enactments, in case the de
facto government is a foreign military occupant, are proper for a
military occupant to enforce. And foreign persons residing in the
area controlled by the de facto government may not be sub-
jected by a subsequent government to penalties for acts which
were enforced by the de facto government.
57
While denying that the Confederate Government was a de
facto government whose acts and obligations could constitute in-
ternational obligations, binding upon the United States or any
state, the Supreme Court of the United States admitted that it
was a de facto government whose "actual supremacy, however
unlawfully gained," within the area of its jurisdiction, "made
obedience to its authority, in civil and local matters, not only a
necessity but a duty. Without such obedience civil order was
impossible.""8
RESPONSIBILITY OF MEXICO FOR THE AcTs OF
REVOLUTIONISTS, 1910-1920
The question of the responsibility of Mexico for the acts of
the various revolutionary forces which operated there, beginning
55Discussed infra. See also (1924) 18 Am. J. Int. L. 143, and 43 Stat.
at L, Part II, 1722.5GSee Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 207.57Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 208. See
also note above, 5, referring to Thorington v. Smith, (1869) 8 Wall.
(U.S.) 1, 19 L. Ed. 361. See also I Wharton, Digest 29.
S8Thorington v. Smith (1869) 8 Wall. (U.S.) 1, 19 L. Ed. 361, cited
In the preceding note.
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in 1910, was the subject of diplomatic discussion between Mexico
and foreign governments from an early period of those disturb-
ances. The Mexican authorities did not deny responsibility
for losses incurred by foreigners at the hands of revolutionists.
In fact, responsibility, in a general way, was freely admitted.00
But a definite settlement of claims was difficult to get. And
finally, on September 22, 1915, the Carranza government pro-
posed to the United States that the matter be indefinitely post-
poned, pending the establishment of order in Mexico. 1
The Special Claims Convention, 2 arranged by the Mexican-
United States Commission, which convened in 1923 to bring
about an agreement upon the basis of which the United States
would recognize the Obregon government, provided for a .Special
Claims Commission to settle claims of the United States against
Mexico "arising from losses or damages suffered by American
citizens through revolutionary acts within the period from No-
vember 20, 1910, to May 31, 1920, inclusive."' 3 The Convention
provided that all claims should be examined and decided accord-
ing to the "principles of justice and equity," it being set forth
that, "The Mexican Government desires that the claims shall
be so decided because Mexico wishes that her responsibility shall
not be fixed according to the generally accepted rules and prin-
ciples of international law, but ex gratia feels morally bound to
make full indemnification and agrees, therefore, that it will be
sufficient that it be established that the alleged loss or damage in
any case was sustained," and that it "was due to any act by the
following forces:
1. "By forces of a government de jure or de facto.
2. "By revolutionary forces as a result of the triumph of
whose cause governments de facto or de jure have been established
or by revolutionary forces opposed to them.
3. "By forces arising from the disjunction of the forces men-
tioned in the next preceding paragraph up.to the time when the
government de jure established itself as a result of a particular
revolution.
59See (1912) For. Rel. 708, 720, 722, 724, 725, 929-986; For. Rel.,
(1913) 823-956; (1914) For. Rel. 655, 656; (1915) For. Rel. 836, 837.
See also Sen. Doc. No. 1, 66th Cong., 1st sess.60(1915) For. Rel. 836.
61(1915) For. Rel. 836.
6
2Signed September 19, 1923, ratifications exchanged February 19,
1924. For the text of the convention, -see (1924) 18 Am. J. Int. L.
143. See also 43 Stat. at L., Part II, 1722.63Similar conventions have been signed with other nations. See 23
Cur. Hist. 568; 24 Cur. Hist. 950; N. Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1927; (1926)
20 Am. J. Int. L. 163, 362.
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4. "By federal forces that were disbanded.
5. "By mutinies or mobs, or insurrectionary forces other than
those referred to under subdivisions 2 and 3 above, or by bandits,
provided in any case it be established that the appropriate authori-
ties omitted to take reasonable measures to suppress insurrection-
ists, mobs, or bandits, or treated then with lenity, or were in
fault in other particulars."
It was further agreed by the Mexican government that the
Commission "shall not disallow or reject any claim by the applica-
tion of the general principal of international law that the legal
remedies must be exhausted as a condition precedent to the validity
or allowance of any claim." And the parties to the convention
agreed to consider the decisions of the Commission "as final and
conclusive upon each claim decided, and to give full effect to
such decisions."
A large number of claims was presented to the Special Claims
Commission, 4 but it has made little progress in disposing of them.
The decision in the Santa Ysabel Casesy given by a majority of
the Commission on April 26, 1926, was drastically criticised, as
being contrary to the terms of the Convention." And. the
resulting situation was not conducive to harmonious operation of
the commission.6 7
The claimants in the Santa Ysabel Cases were American
citizens who sought damages for the massacre of sixteen Ameri-
cans, relatives of the claimants, in Mexico in January, 1916, by a
group of armed men under the leadership of one Pablo Lopez, but
the responsibility for which was traced to General Villa, who had
been engaged in revolutionary effort against the Carranza govern-
ment, and who, at the time of the massacre, was engaged in ban-
ditry in the region of Santa Ysabel. The majority opinion rejected
the claims on the ground that, at the time of the murders, Villa
and his followers, including the Lopez group, did not have the
status of re'volutionists, or of any of the forces for which Mexico
had agreed to be held responsible. It held that the murderers were
64See (1925) 19 Am. J. Int. L. 365. For detailed accounts of the
incidents for which claims were presented, 'see Sen. Documents, Vols.
IX, X, XIV, No. 165 and No. 285, 66th Cong., 2d sess.
65Docket No. 449, Special Claims Commission, United States and
Mexico (1926).
66See the dissenting opinion of Judge Ernest B. Perry, American
Commissioner; and N. Y. Times, April 27, 1926.
67Dr. Rodrigo Octavio, original Chairman of the Commission who
joined with Senor F. Gonzalez Roa, Mexican Commissioner, in the
opinion in the Santa Ysabel Cases, resigned in July, 1926, giving reasons
of poor health.
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simply bandits, and cited evidence to show that neither the Mexican
government, nor the government of the United States, at that
time considered them to be anything other than bandits.s As
bandits, Mexico had accepted responsibility for their acts, only
in case it should appear that the Mexican government:
1. had not exercised proper diligence in guarding against
their operations; or
2. had shown lenity in dealing with them after their depreda-
tions had been committed.
The opinion held that neither of these conditions was present in
the case, pointing out that the entire band of murderers was
executed, and so dismissed the claims.
The American Commissioner dissented, contending that the
murderers were not only bandits, but also revolutionists, for whose
acts the Mexican government had agreed to be responsible by
the terms of the Special Claims Convention.
As stated at the beginning, the extent of the legal responsibility
of the state for the acts of local de facto governments is perhaps
somewhat less certain than in the case of de facto governments
which control for a time the whole area of the state. The respon-
sibility of the state for the acts of revolutionists maintaining con-
trol over only a portion of the state's territory depends largely
upon the ultimate outcome of the revolution. If it succeeds and the
organization becomes the de jure government, then its acts, from
its beginning, are held to be binding upon the state. But if it
fails, the state may disregard many of its acts. I lowever, as has
been pointed out, the state has been held to be liable in some
instances for certain of the acts of governments of this sort.
Among the suggested projects for codification of international
law, submitted in 1925 by the American Institute of International
Law for the consideration of the International Commission of
Jurists at its meeting in Rio de Janeiro, in 1927, was one designed
to facilitate the determination of "the responsibility of the Ameri-
68A general amnesty had been extended to General Villa's men by
the Mexican government after his decisive defeat in September, 1915.
About eight hundred of his followers accepted the amnesty. And the
diplomatic correspondence of the United States Department of State
at the time, and the language of the United States Congress in a
resolution relative to the sending of armed forces across the Mexican
border in pursuit of Villa and his followers in 1916 were cited to
show that those men were considered no more than a "lawless band of
armed men," or a "fugitive band of outlaws." See (1916) For. Rel.
489, 491, 582. See also a statement by President Wilson (1916) 10 Am.
J. Int. L. Supp. 191.
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can Republics with regard to foreigners for damages which
they may suffer on the territory of those republics," '0 from
revolutionary disturbances. The suggestion is indicative of the
unsatisfactory status of international law on the subject.7"
"
9The original proposal was that a convention should be concluded
by the American republics to the effect that:
"Article I. The Government of each American Republic is obliged
to maintain on its own territory the internal order and governmental
stability indispensible to the fulfillment of international duties.
"Article II. As a consequence of the rule formulated in the pre-
ceding Article, the governments of the American Republics are not
responsible for damages suffered by foreigners, in their persons or in
their property for any reason whatsoever, except when the said
governments have not maintained order in the interior, having been
negligent in the suppression of acts disturbing this order, or, finally,
have not taken precautions so, far as they were able to prevent the
occurrence of such damages or injuries."70See (1926) 20 Am. J. Int. L. Supp. 328. See, however, Borchard,
in (1927) 21 Am. J. Int. L. 118.
